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IS THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE OBSOLETE?
HAROLD F. MONIECE t
JOHN V. THORNTON *
I.

INTRODUCTION

S HAKESPEARE'S

Hamlet, when pondering whether "to be or
not to be," included among those "arrows of outrageous
fortune" which made of death "a consummation devoutly to
be wished" the "law's delay." Thus it can hardly be said that
the problem of the slowness with which the wheels of justice
grind-a problem exemplified today by the grievous calendar
congestion in the courts, particularly as to negligence cases
-is a novel one. The lack of novelty, however, is unfortunately no index of a lack of seriousness. Indeed, it is not
too much to say that, especially in the large urban centers of
the nation, the delay in the trial and decision of negligence
cases is the largest single problem confronting the courts.
Hence it is that the Honorable David M. Peck, Presiding
Justice of the Appellate Division, First Department, New
York State Supreme Court, in January, 1952 uttered what
may be a prophetic warning for the bench and bar in New
York City and even throughout the nation:
. .we must acknowledge that for all efforts to date we have not
found the way of handling the influx of accident cases and must recognize that present practices and procedures are insufficient. If we
fail to take further measures and find the means of dispensing timely
justice in these cases as a court service then we face the inevitable
day when a public sufficiently aroused and exasperated will take these
cases, automobile accidents at least, bodily out of the court and place
them with an administrative agency like a compensation board.'
*

t Professor of Law, St John's University School of Law, and Member
of the New York Bar.
t Instructor in Law, New York University School of Law, and Member
of the New York Bar.
"The Pillar of Justice." Address at the January 14, 1952 Meeting of
Members of the Bar and Insurance Company Executives Invited by Justices of
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Justice Peck, in the address in which he spoke that
warning, painted a shocking picture of the "law's delay" in
personal injury cases in New York's First Judicial Department. The Supreme Court tort jury calendar, he pointed
out, is now almost four years behind-forty-six months to be
exact, whereas the other calendars (non-jury, equity, condemnation, tax certiorari, motion, contract) are right up to
date or virtually so.
The causes of this unreasonable delay, as seen by
Justice Peck, are substantially these:
(a) The bringing of minor actions in the Supreme Court
which do not belong there.
(b) The jury trial bottleneck. The jury trial became a
bottleneck because it was generally sought by plaintiffs' lawyers who thought they might fare better
with a jury than with a judge. When the jury trial
became a bottleneck, it was sought by the insurers
of defendants because it meant delay, and delay
was considered an advantage in inducing settlements on terms favorable to the insurers.
(c) The policy of lawyers to delay the settlement of
cases until the eve of the trial or after the start of
the trial. Neither side gets serious about settlement
until the trial is at least in the immediate offing.
As practices already in operation which are designed to
remedy the deplorable calendar situation, the Presiding
Justice referred to:
(a) The preference rule in New York and Bronx County
Supreme Court Trial Terms which provides for
the Supreme Court and Presidents of Local Bar Associations to Hear Court
Recommendations for Handling Personal Injury Litigation, 127 N. Y. L. J.179
(January 15, 1952). The problem of calendar congestion is not, of course,
limited to the Supreme Court in New York City. Thus Supreme Court Justice
George J.Beldock recently pointed out the critical situation in the City Court
in Brooklyn where the 1952 input of cases is expected to be 9,500 and the dispositions at most 3,500 or a net residue of at least 6,000 at the end of the year
(Brooklyn Eagle, pp. 1, 10, March 9, 1952). See also Note, Calendar Congestio in the Southern District of New York, 51 COL. L. RaE. 1037 (1951), pointing out that there is approximately a three-year delay in one of the most important federal trial courts.
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screening cases in the Supreme Court on the basis
of a verified bill of particulars and attorney's certificate to ascertain whether a case belongs in the
Supreme Court. If it does, it is preferred. If not,
it is not preferred, which means in effect that its
possibility of being reached for trial in the Supreme
Court is rendered virtually nil, thus, as a practical
matter, requiring the attorney to transfer the ease
to a court of lower monetary jurisdiction.
(b) The pre-trial conference which is a further preliminary screening of cases in pre-trial parts of the
Supreme Court with the purpose of effecting settlements in those where trials are needless.
(c)

The new rule allowing mutual examinations before
trial of parties in negligence actions which allows
both sides to get the facts when they are fresh, with
consequent further opportunity for early settlement.

Justice Peck also urged that negligence lawyers help
matters by bringing cases in the court in which they belong,
by being ready for trial when reached, by waiving juries and
expediting trials,2 and by settling all appropriate cases as
early as possible. Finally, without making recommendations
in this further area, he suggested that the bar give thought
to possible modifications of the substantive law, such as
abolishing the bar of contributory negligence and adopting
a system of comparative negligence, and eliminating jury
trials in negligence cases. 3
2 It may well be that there is little difference in practical effect between
verdicts rendered by juries and by courts. Judge Richard Hartshorne of the
Court of Common Pleas, Newark, New Jersey, has pointed out his experience
with jury verdicts over a period of 12 years. He kept a record of his agreement with the verdicts and discovered that out of 270 criminal verdicts he disagreed with only about 30 and out of 253 civil verdicts he disagreed with 38.
In other words he agreed with 89% of the criminal verdicts and 85% of the
civil verdicts. This article is also interesting as showing the large percentage
of negligence cases which result in plaintiffs' verdicts. Out of 3,330 automobile
accident cases checked by Judge Hartshorne, 2,386 verdicts were rendered for
the plaintiff and 944 for the defendant. Hartshorne, Jury Verdicts: A Study
of Their Characteristicsand Trends, 35 A. B. A. J. 113 (1949).
3 See 17 REP. JUIcIAL CoUNcl. OF THE STATE OF Nmv YoRx 14 (1951).
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This dark picture, drawn with few hopeful strokes, must
give us pause to think. It is high time that the bar reexamined the whole foundation, substantive and procedural,
of our accident law, for it is apparent that the foundation,
at least in great urban centers of the nation, has become so
weakened that the whole structure is tottering. Such a reexamination is a vast task which this article seeks to do only
in bare outline.' The purpose here is to present a summary
of the evolution which during the past fifty years or more
has occurred in the concept of negligence, especially from the
substantive law viewpoint, and a partial analysis of that concept in terms of modern needs. As will be seen, it may well
be that the complete answer to the accident problems of our
modern age, if there is such an answer, does not lie merely
in more pre-trial conferences or freer examinations before
trial or more judges, but rather in basic changes in the legal
structure of the law of torts or in the administration of that
law, or both.
II.

THE GENERAL PICTURE

It is but a commonplace to observe that the single most
important, modern change in the law of negligence-as indeed in most other phases of the law-has been a steady,
though at times almost imperceptible, movement away from
the recognition of individual interests alone and toward the
recognition of social interests. The theory of rugged individualism in negligence law, as in other realms of human
existence, has yielded, for good or ill, to the theory of what
might be called, paradoxically enough, "social individualism."
The law no longer looks upon accident litigation as a private
contest between individuals with which society is not concerned,4 but rather as a process of adjustment between in4". . . under the extreme individualistic philosophy of the 18th and 19th
centuries, nearly the whole of law was conceived and interpreted in terms of
the rights of individuals, chiefly rights of property and contract, and in this
way social interests were made to appear, at the most, as mere negative limitations upon the rights of individuals." BOWMAN, HANDBOOx OF ELPMENTARY

LAW 80 (1929). Another thoughtful observer has phrased the change between
the outlook of the 19th and 20th centuries thus: "While in general the 19th
century saw the American primarily interested in getting ahead, the 20th century showed a new dominant force primarily concerned with the security of
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dividuals in which society has a vital interest.5 The effort
in this paper, as above stated, is to show how this new outlook has manifested itself in alterations in legal rules, and to
put forth some few remarks on the effectiveness of these rules
in achieving the basic goals underlying tort theory.
Negligence as a ground of tort liability is, of course, a
relative newcomer to the common law. The history of that
development need not be traced here,6 except to mention that7
negligence came into its own only in the nineteenth century.
The early common law, by and large, imposed no liability for
failure to act and decreed strict liability for positive acts,
irrespective of fault.8 With the advent of negligence theory,
there came modifications in the direction, generally speaking,
of relieving the actor from responsibility where he had acted
without "fault" 9 and holding him liable where he had acted
with "fault." Liability was imposed where one had failed to
act reasonably in any one of a myriad of circumstances in
which the law saw fit to impose a duty of care-or, much
more rarely, had failed to act at all in some few situations
where the law ordained an affirmative duty."°
the individual." Re, Book Review, THn GRowTH OF AmmuCAN LAW, 25 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 149, 150 (1950).
5 Dean Pound has said: "The whole body of the common law is made up
of compromises of conflicting individual interests in which we turn to some
social interest, frequently under the name of public policy, to determine the
limits of a reasonable adjustment. . . . Obviously it is important to recognize
what we are doing in law and how and why we are doing it. And a first step
in this direction must be to clarify the conception of public policy; to construct
a theory of social interests which courts may use . . . ." PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AmERiCAN SOCIOLOGICAL SoCqTY, Vols. 15, 16, 17 (May,
1921).6
It is delineated in 8 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 449 et seq.
(1926).
7 "It is practically almost impossible to find, prior to the nineteenth century, any case in which the defendant was held liable in tort on the ground of
negligence." Jenks, On Negligence and Deceit in the Law of Torts, 26 L. Q.
Rnv.8 159, 160 (1910).
Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 HARv. L. REv. 315 (1894).
9 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 6 Gush. 292 (Mass. 1850) ; Stanley v. Powell,
[1891] 1 Q. B. 86. An interesting analysis of Brown v. Kendall, the famous
case where the defendant in seeking to separate two fighting dogs accidentally
hit the plaintiff in the eye, and related holdings, is found in HOLMES, TE
CommoN LAw 102-107 (1881).
1o Jenks, On Negligence and Deceit in the Law of Torts, 26 L. Q. Rav. 159
(1910); McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALxE L. J.
1272 (1949). The relationship between economic change and the breakdown
of the early common law notion of strict liability in trespass in favor of a
theory of negligence has been well stated in Gregory, Trespass to Negligence
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LIABILITY

The strictness, or the "defendant-mindedness" as it
might be called, of early negligence law is too well known to
require review. In 1881, Holmes could write with accuracy:
"The general principle of our law is that loss from accident
must lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by
the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune." '
But, since Holmes so characterized accident
law, there has been a positive trend towards the extension of
liability for negligence and the restriction of defenses, all
directed towards shifting the economic loss from accident
and not letting it lie where it falls. Sometimes this trend
has been reflected in alterations in procedural rules, but more
often in modifications of substantive law. Some illustrations
may here be noted.
A.

Extension of Duties of Manufacturers and Suppliers
of Chattels 12

Since Winterbottom v. Wright 13 declared that a supplier
and repairer of chattels was under no duty to anyone other
than his immediate promisee to employ reasonable care in
order to discover defects, the law has undergone a complete
transformation, and this in disregard of Lord Abinger's
warning in that case that "[u] nless we confine the operations
of such contracts ...

to the parties who entered into them,

the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can
see no limit, would ensue." 14 This transformation began
with the cases which permitted recovery for negligence in the
preparation of dangerous articles intended to preserve, deto Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. Rzv. 359, 382 (1951): ". . . the principle
eliminating the unintended trespass as a substantive tort and establishing a
consistent theory of liability based on fault -was developed to confer on industrial enterprise an immunity from liability for accidental harm to others. Apparently the idea was to tax enterprise with the cost of only those damages
avoidably caused"
11 HOLmES, THE CommIo LAW 94 (1881).
12 The present writers have analyzed this problem in more detail in McNiece
and Thornton, Affirmative Dities in Tort, 58 YALE L. J. 1272, 1275-77 (1949).
See also Notes, 33 CoL. L. REv. 868 (1933); 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 771 (1934);
4 U. OF CMI. L. REv. 461 (1937).
23 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
14 Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
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Later it was held that the rule

extended as well to articles which are not dangerous in themselves, but are dangerous if negligently made. A further

step in this growth was the expansion of the principle to
cover the suppliers of chattels as well as the makers.

Today

the rule may be stated, with sufficient accuracy for present
purposes, as follows: A manufacturer or supplier must employ reasonable care in the manufacture, assembling or
supply of chattels which, while not necessarily dangerous in

themselves, will constitute a menace to life and limb or to
property if not manufactured or maintained with care, and

this duty extends to anyone likely to be harmed by the defective chattel while being used for the purpose intended.'
Thus the law has striven to keep pace with the economic
changes which have converted this nation from an agrarian
economy into a great industrial machine which constantly
pours forth a stream of chattels dangerous to life and limb,
or at least to property, if not carefully controlled. Happily,
the legal changes thus far wrought show no sign of producing
"most absurd and outrageous consequences." 17
B.

Ewtension of Duties of Owners and Occupiers of Land1 8

One of the most significant aspects of the broadening
liability of land occupiers has been the startling alterations
15Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852) ; Norton v. Lewall, 106 Mass.
143 (1870); Peters v. Johnson, 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S. E. 190 (1902).
16 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 383, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916);
Berg v. Otis Elev. Co., 64 Utah 518, 231 Pac. 832 (1924); Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923); Smith v. Peerless Glass
Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932); Clark, Let the Maker Beware, 19
ST. JoHiN's L. R~v. 85 (1945). One of the earliest cases extending the principle of manufacturer's liability to property damage was G. C. P. Fire Relief
Ass'n v. Sonnenborn, 263 N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551 (1934). A recent decision
showing the application of the rule to suppliers of chattels is La Rocca v.
Farrington, 301 N. Y. 247, 93 N. E. 2d 829 (1950); cf. Smolen v. Grandview
Dairy, Inc., 301 N. Y. 265, 93 N. E. 2d 839 (1950).
17 Professor Ehrenzweig in his recent work, Negligence Witlut Fault
(1951), sets forth the thesis that liability without reference to moral fault
should prevail for harms which flow from typical risks of the enterprise, a
typical risk being one whose general character or type frequently attends the
operation in question. Professor Malone in his review of the volume, while
recognizing its significance as a contribution, concludes that ". . . the problem
of risk sorting will become aggravated, rather than simplified, under the author's proposal ....
" Malone, The Brave New World-A Review of "Negligence Without Fault," 25 So. CALIF. L. REv. 14, 20 (1951).

isFor a fuller discussion of the principles of liability in this area, see
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in the law relating to trespassers. While the traditional rule
that a land occupier is liable to a trespasser only for "wilful
or wanton" negligence has not changed significantly in its
verbal formulation, the practical effects of that rule have
been vastly altered by applying to mere ordinarily negligent
conduct the brand of "wilful or wanton" and by denominating persons who, traditionally viewed, are trespassers as
"licensees." 19 There can be little doubt that an increasing
general concern for personal rights, as opposed to property
rights, a concern which is typical of the whole national
politico-economic shift from laissez-faire to what might be
called a semi-paternalism, has been at the root of these modifications in legal principles. Moreover, whereas years ago
there were not many serious dangers to be encountered on
land, today power transmission lines and machinery of various sorts in farm and urban communities present new hazards which the courts have attempted to meet with new rules.
Important extensions of liability, unnecessary to detail
here, have also appeared in the rules relating to lessors and
vendors of land, 20 and even the long standing doctrine that a
possessor need not protect persons outside his premises
against risks incident to the natural condition of the land
seems to be eroding away, at least in urban centers. 2 1 That
doctrine grew up in an agricultural economy when land was
largely in a natural state and when the burden of inspection
would have been a heavy one; not unnaturally, therefore,
modifications in it are occurring as the pattern of land use
shifts, with extensive exploitation of land giving way to intensive exploitation.
McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative -Dutiesin Tort, 58

(1949).
1

YALE

L. J. 1272, 1273-76

9 Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEmp. L. Q. 32 (1937), contains a thoroughly documented study of this trend. One of the newer cases
showing the tendency on the part of the courts to extend protection to persons
on land is Pedro v. Newman, 277 App. Div. 567, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 146 (1st
Dep't
1950).
20
PaossER, TORTS 644-665 (1941); Note, 18 TEXAS L. REv. 99 (1939);
Note, 47 HARv. L. REv. 357 (1933); Kaufman, Torts, Annual Survey of New
York Law, 24 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1277, 1278 (1949).
21 Compare Chambers v. Whelan, 44 F. 2d 340 (4th Cir. 1930), zvith Brown
v. Milwaukee Terminal Ry., 199 Wis. 575, 227 N. W. 385 (1929). See also
Weller v. McCormick, 52 N. J. L. 470, 19 Atl. 1101 (Sup. Ct. 1890).
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Other Extensions of Liability

Increased recognition has been given in the courts to
emotional disturbance as an element of damage, and it is no
longer a bar to recovery, in most jurisdictions, that physical
harm was brought about through emotional shock without
physical impact.2 2 Even those states which still nominally
adhere to the "no liability without impact" rule have stripped
the principle of much of its harshness by diluting it with

frequent exceptions. 23 Underlying these developments are
the more complete knowledge of human psychology available
in the modern age and the recognition that a mechanized
civilization is certain to have a large quota of psychic in24
juries with which the law must deal fairly.

Another factor which has broadened the vistas of liability has been the movement away from court-made standards of conduct in particular cases; this, of course, has made

it simpler for a plaintiff to get to the jury on the issues of
negligence and contributory fault. 2 r A more liberal interpretation of the doctrines of last clear chance 26 and res ipsa
22 See, e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Company, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402
(1941); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts,
49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and
Disease,
30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
23
MNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoHN'S
L. REv.
1 (1949).
24
The recognition of the right of privacy and the advocacy of the elimination of truth as an absolute defense to defamation have been other manifestations of the trend towards recognition of injuries to mental interests. See
Harnett and Thornton, The Truth Hurts: A Critique of a Defense to Defamation, 35 VA. L. REv. 425, 437 (1949); Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HAav.
L. REv. 725, 731 et seq. (1937) ; Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law
of Privacy, 48 COL. L. REv. 713 (1948).
25 Nixon, Changing Rides of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation,
3 LAW AND CONTEMP. PRoB. 476 (1936); James, Accident Liability: Some
Wartime Developments, 55 YALE L. J. 365, 374 et seq. (1946). As has been
pointed out in SHULMAN AND JAMES, CASES ON TORTS 625-626 (1942), "It
is clear that the application of such [court-made] standards tends to keep an
issue from the jury. This in turn helps defendants, for if a plaintiff can get
to the jury he has far more than an even chance of winning a verdict. This
is well-recognized by negligence lawyers and so the matter of settlement is
governed to a very considerable extent by the likelihood that plaintiff will get
by a motion for a non suit, directed verdict, new trial, or judgment N.O.V."
26 Chesapeake and 0. Ry. v. Pope, 296 Ky. 254, 176 S. W. 2d 876 (1943);
Krause v. Pitcairn, 350 Mo. 339, 167 S. W. 2d 74 (1942); Chadwick v. City
of New York, 301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950) ; see also PRossrR, TORTS
408 et seq. (1941). The Chadwick case extends the rule to cover the situation
where the defendant does not actually know of the particular plaintiff's peril
but at least knows that someone is in danger.
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loquitur27 has had a similar effect. Yet another area of
liability extension is found in the tendency of courts towards
28
recognition of principles of recovery for pre-natal injuries.
Extensions of negligence liability have also been accomplished through the warranty device. For a good many years
the implied warranty of fitness has meant strict liability between persons in contract relationship, but this older doctrine has been widened in an effort to protect consumers so
that today manufacturers are often being held strictly
liable
29
to consumers not in privity of contract with them.
27 See, e.g., Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940
(D. D. C. 1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687 (1944),
a#ff'd, 93 Cal. 2d 43, 208 P. 2d 445 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.. 1949); Godfrey v.
Brown, 220 Cal. 57, 29 P. 2d 165 (1934). The Ybarra case carried the res ipsa
doctrine to great lengths. There plaintiff was operated on for appendicitis, and,
when he came out of the ether, it was discovered that he had suffered a traumatic injury to his shoulder. It was held that res ipsa applied as against the
diagnostician who was present at the operation, the surgeon, the anaesthetist,
the nurses, two orderlies, and the superintendent of the hospital, even though
no one of these defendants was in exclusive control of the situation.
28 Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio 114, 87 N. E. 2d 334 (1949);
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N. W. 2d 838 (1949) ; Note, 24 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 310 (1950) ; cf. Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N. E. 2d
206 (1950); Note, 31 B. U. L. R1%v. 104 (1951). The New York Court of
Appeals in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N. Y. 349 (1951), recently flatly overruled
its earlier holding on the subject and allowed recovery for pre-natal injury.
See also Note, New Infant Rights in Torts, 35 VA. L. REv. 618 (1949);
Johnson, Tort Liability for Prenatal Injury, 24 TuLANE L. REv. 435 (1950) ;
Markovitz, Prenatal Injury: Does This Constitute a Cause of Action?,
6 N. Y. U. INTRAmURAL L. REV. 208 (1951).
29 Gregory refers to this development as the "jumping warranty" and comments: "This perversion of good old legal doctrine is bewildering; it is all
right, perhaps, as far as the social result is concerned, but it is a type of judicial legislation which is defensible only if the courts call it by its right name
of absolute liability without fault, or, if I may suggest a new term, enterprise
liability." Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REv. 359, 384, 395 (1951).
The author cites as indicative of the new trend:
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Smith, 128 Texas 214, 97 S. W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936); Kroger Grocery Co. v. Lewelling, 165 Miss. 71, 145 So. 726
(1933); Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Miss. 426, 141 So. 762 (1932);
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927);
Scruggins v. Jones, 207 Ky. 636, 269 S. W. 743 (1925) ; Mazetti v. Armor and
Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 632 (1913).
Professor Whitney in his LAw OF
SALES § 143, p. 217 et seq. (1947), points out that in New York a manufactrer is not liable for breach of implied warranty of quality to the ultimate
consumer in the absence of negligence. So that, before the manufacturer can
be held liable on the implied warranty, two suits are necessary, one by the
consumer against the dealer and then another by the dealer against the manufacturer. Professor Whitney suggests that since the manufacturer is going
to be ultimately liable anyway, the procedure should be shortened by allowing
the ultimate consumer to sue the manufacturer directly and thus make one
suit out of it instead of two.
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THE IMPACT OF INSURANCE

At least with presently available modes of legal analysis,
the alteration in legal doctrines, heretofore discussed, cannot
conclusively be shown to be directly traceable to the growing
use of liability insurance. Doubtless, however, the effects of
insurance in distributing losses over a wider social group and
protecting individual defendants from economic ruin have
been important considerations weighing in the judicial minds
which have fashioned these changes. Moreover, insurance
has played a more overt role in recasting some other tort
doctrines. Since our concern is with the broad outlines of
this recasting, rather than with specific documentation, 0 it
is only necessary here to point up a few illustrations.
A.

Suits by Minors and Spouses

Although courts have for centuries entertained actions
involving property rights between parent and child, it is the
traditional rule that an unemancipated minor child may not
sue his parent for a personal injury sustained through negligence because such a suit, it is said, tends to disrupt family
tranquillity and is unfair to the other children because it results in allocating to the suing child some fixed portion of
the family's monetary resources.3 1 Obviously these dangers,
assuming that they were ever a justifiable reason for barring
such litigation, have no basis in fact when the parent is
insured,32 and there are some indications that the courts are
30 For a more detailed analysis of the role played by liability insurance,
see James and Thornton, The Impact of Insurance on; the Law of Torts, 15
LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 431 (1950).
31
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. 2d 677 (D. C. Cir. 1948); Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923); Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891).
See also Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A. 2d 765 (1942) ;
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 At. 498 (1930); Norfolk Southern
R. R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S. E. 841 (1934); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAIv. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
Of similar import are Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927), and Segall
v. Ohio Casualty Company, 224 Wis. 379, 272 N. W. 665 (1937). A recent
case illustrating the rule that an unemancipated minor may recover for a
willful
tort is Cowgill v. Boock, 218 P. 2d 455 (Ore. 1950).
32
Indeed McCurdy states that ". . . the strongest argument against such actions is . . . the danger of domestic collusion." McCurdy, Torts Between
Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv.L. Rav. 1030, 1052-1053 (1930).
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reframing the rule so as to permit a child-parent suit when
the burden of damages has been shifted to the insurance
carrier. 83
Similar considerations apply to litigation between husband and wife. The theory of the principle which forbids
such suits is that domestic peace will be threatened by their
allowance. Yet, while a majority of courts still follow the
old rule, 4 there are definite indications that forward-looking
judges, realizing that the presence of liability insurance removes the threat to family harmony, are gradually eliminating the interdiction on husband-wife suits.3 5
B. Direct Suits by Injured Parties Against Insurers
The basic common law view was that a contract of liability insurance is limited to the insurer and the insured so
that a party injured by the insured's negligence could not
directly invoke its benefits.3 6 A process of evolution, 7 fortified by statutory enactments, has resulted in the present pre33 See, e.g., Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932); Dunlap
v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Adt. 905 (1930). See also Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939) ; Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La.
171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 At. 753
(1929). Certain of the British Commonwealth jurisdictions have abrogated the
rule denying the right to sue. Young v. Rankin, [1934] S. C. 499 (Scotland) ;
Fidelity etc. Co. v. Marchand, 4 D. L. R. (1923) 913 (Canada). The rule
has not been extended to suits between brothers and sisters. Rozell v. Rozell,
281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254 (1939); Munsert v. Farmers' Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 229 Wis. 581, 281 N. W. 671 (1939).
34 Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Association, 123 N. J. L. 252, 8 A. 2d 337,
338 (1939) ; Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N. W. 305 (1927) ; Newton
v. Weber, 119 Misc. 240, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922); Kyle v. Kyle, 210 Minn.
204, 297 N. W. 744 (1941); Schroeder v. Longenecker, 7 F. R. D. 9 (E. D.
Mo. 1947).
35 See Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P. 2d 660 (1938) ; Haglund,
Tort Actions Between Husband and Wife, 27 GEo. L. J. 697, 893 (1939);
Shumaker, Action for Tort Between Husband and Wife, 30 LAw NOTES 165
(1926).
36Bain v. Atkins, 181 Mass. 240, 63 N. E. 414 (1902); Clark v. W. R.
Bonsai and Co., 157 N. C. 270, 72 S. E. 954 (1911).
37 See Anoka Lumber Co. v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 63 Minn. 286, 65
N. W. 353 (1895); Hoven v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 93 Wis.
201, 67 N. W. 46 (1896). The "no-action" clause for a time put a stop to
the salutary effect of such decisions. Allen v. Aetnq Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed.
881 (3d Cir. 1906); compare Carter v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 76 Kan. 275, 91
Pac. 178 (1907), with Blanton v. Kansas City Cotton Mills Co., 103 Kan. 118,
172 Pac. 987 (1918) ; Luger v. Windell, 116 Wash. 375, 199 Pac. 760 (1921) ;
Staggs v. Gotham Mining and Milling Co., 208 Mo. App. 596, 235 S. W. 511
(1921).
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vailing rule that, after judgment has been obtained against
an insured and returned unsatisfied, an action may be
brought by the injured victim directly against the insurance
company.3 8 Some few states even permit such an action
prior to judgment against the insured 9

C.

Governmental and Charitable Immunity

Governmental immunity is grounded in the notion that
tax money should be employed to support public projects and
not to satisfy private claims. 40 Whatever may have been the
justification for such immunity in the days when government's main functions were to keep the peace, protect against
foreign aggression, and deliver the mails, it is clear that there
is little to be said in favor of the immunity in today's era of
government as a huge business. Remedial statutes have
recognized this fact,4 1 and, even without such statutes, many
governmental subdivisions have attempted to use the insurance device as a mode of protecting victims injured by the
activities of governmental agents. The difficulties facing
42
such attempts are many and have been described elsewhere,
but, all-in-all, it is safe to say that the remedial statutes and
the insurance device are paving the way for a more just distribution of losses in this area.
3s Jackson v. Citizens Casualty Co., 277 N. Y. 385 14 N. E. 2d 446 (1938);
Shea v. United States Fidelity Co., 98 Conn. 447, 120 Atl. 286 (1923) ; Merchants Mutual Automobile Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U. S. 126 (1925).
39 Elliot v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 201 Wis. 445, 230 N. V.
87 (1930) ; Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935);
Lusk v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941).
40

Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAnv. L.

REv. 437 (1941) ; Note, 33 MINx. L. REv. 634 (1949) ; see also Claims Against
the State in Minnesota, 32 MINx. L. Rnv. 539 (1948); Shumate, Tort Claims
Against State Governments, 9 LAv AND CoNTEmP. PRoB. 242 (1942); Lloyd,

Municipal
Tort Liability in New York, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 278 (1948).
41
See, e.g., FEDERAL ToRT CL.ims AcT, 60 STAT. 842, 28 U. S. C.

§§ 921-46

(1946); CAuFORNIA VEH. CODE § 400 (1943); N. Y. CT. OF CLAImS Ace § 8;
see McNiece and Thornton, The Federal Tort Claims Act and its Application
to Military
Personnel, 5 V.Nm. L. Rlv. 57 (1951).
42
James and Thornton, The Impact .of Insurance on the Law of Torts, 15
LAW AN CoNrEMP. PRoB. 431, 438 (1950).
Illustrative of the problems are:
Lambert v. City of New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A. 2d 723 (1943) ; Boice v.
Board of Education, 111 W. Va. 95, 160 S. E. 566 (1931); Kesman v. School
Dist. of Fallowfield Township, 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. 2d 17 (1942); Jones v. Scofield Bros., 73 F. Supp. 395 (D. Md. 1947); Pohland v. Sheboygan, 251 Wis.
20, 27 N. W. 2d 736 (1947); Utz v. Board of Education, 126 W. Va. 823,
30 S. E. 2d 342 (1944).
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Charitable immunity is similarly premised, at least in
part, on the idea that the charity's resources are in the nature of a "trust fund" and are to be used to advance. the
direct purposes of the charity rather than to pay private
judgments. 43 Where insurance is present there is no inroad
into the "trust fund," except to the extent of payment of
premiums out of the fund, and thus a growing minority of
jurisdictions have struck down the immunity defense under
44
such circumstances.
V.

PRESENT 'STATUS OF THE NEGLIGENCE CONCEPT

We see, then, that the law of negligence has undergone
noteworthy expansion in the past fifty or more years-an
expansion which has been consistently in the direction of
(a) altering legal rules so as to increase the duties imposed
upon defendants, and (b) permitting more issues to go before juries which tend to be, as a rule, "plaintiff-minded."
The most important manifestations of this expansion have
been in the fields of manufacturers and suppliers of chattels,
owners and occupiers of land, and governmental and charitable immunity. In addition, noticeable but less obvious
changes have occurred in the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur
and last clear chance, as well as in the rules relating to implied warranties, psychic injuries, pre-natal injuries, suits
by minors and spouses, and direct suits by injured parties
against insurers.
It is believed that these trends have been a manifestation of public awareness, which has filtered into the judicial
process, that the economic loss due to accident should be
distributed over wide groups rather than ruinously imposed
upon individuals. Since, by and large, the kinds of persons
who are most likely to be defendants--corporations, municipalities, and so on-are more capable of distributing these
43
Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote an excellent essay on the theories underlying
charitable immunity in President and Directors of Georgetown College v.

Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D. C. Cir. 1942).
44 Illustrative are: O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105
Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939) ; Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn.
App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938); Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App.
359, 76 N. E. 2d 342 (1947).
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losses than are the average plaintiffs, rules of law have been
4
and are still being altered to facilitate such distribution. G
The presence of liability insurance on the scene has been
an important factor in achieving these shifts in legal principle. Furthermore, the effect of insurance is not limited to
alteration of legal rules, for, when juries know that defendants are very probably covered by insurance, they are certainly more likely, at least in close cases, to cast the burden
of the losses upon the insurance companies, knowing that
they can redistribute such losses among large groups of
policyholders. Thus we seem to be evolving a type of "common law social insurance."
And yet this system of "common law social insurance"
is, it must be admitted, a most haphazard and only partially
satisfactory one. While it cannot be conclusively demonstrated, it is certainly the common feeling of many negligence
lawyers that juries in numerous instances reach their verdicts (generally for plaintiffs) in disregard of applicable
rules of law laid down in the courts' charges; typical is the
juror's disregard of the rules relating to negligence and contributory negligence. It is also common knowledge that trial
courts in most instances do not set aside such verdicts, first,
because of their limited power to interfere with jury findings,
and secondly, because of their reluctance to interfere even
where they technically have the power so to do.4 6 When this
reluctance of trial judges to interfere with jury verdicts is
combined with the disposition of appellate courts to sustain
such verdicts where possible, on the theory that only questions of fact are concerned, it becomes obvious that in many
cases plaintiffs gain recoveries in spite of, rather than pursuant to, the theoretically applicable principles of substan45 An analysis of the effect of the indemnity between tort-feasors rule in
distributing such losses is found in Meriam and Thornton, Indemnity Between
Tort-Feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25

N. Y.
46 U. L. Q. R.v. 845 (1950).

E.g., in Murphy v. Peterson Cipher Code Corp., 278 App. Div. 966 (2d
Dep't 1951), although the trial judge severely castigated the jury for bringing

in a plaintiff's verdict and stated that he did not want that jury "back here in

any case that I am sitting on," he refused to set the verdict aside even though,
in his view, a preponderance of evidence on the issues of negligence and contributory negligence was not presented and the plaintiff's burden of proof was

not met.

(Record on Appeal to the Appellate Division, folios 444-461, 469.)
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tive law.4 7 Even the most ardent advocate of the jury as a
leavening influence in the law can hardly take joy in such a
situation.
It is also true that our present system of rough social
justice lends itself well to perjured testimony. We have all
heard much of the peril of fraud and perjury in "trumped
up" divorce and annulment cases, yet the negligence lawyer
knows only too well that unscrupulous attorneys and litigants may, and sometimes do, act unethically in order to
build up the thin framework of a case sufficiently to enable
it to go to a jury.
But the greatest evil in negligence law today is that it
does not produce a proper distribution of the economic loss.
Studies have shown that the general effect of our present
system, even where there is insurance, is probably to overcompensate those who have suffered minor injuries and to
undercompensate those who have suffered major hurts.4 8 The
more serious the injury, the less the chance of full compensation. If there is no insurance, there is perhaps one chance in
49
four that the injured party will receive any payment at all.
Moreover, as has already been discussed, it is obvious that in
many or most cases, particularly those involving large claims,
protracted litigation, frequently involving long calendar delays, will precede any recovery.
VI.

THE

FUTURE

The foregoing discussion, we suggest, indicates at least
a grave possibility that the concept of negligence, as it exists
47 This tendency of juries to disregard rules of law has even greater effects
in a period of inflation such as the present. Not only do juries sometimes give
away defendants' money in disregard of legal rules, but, in a time such as this
they are likely to be overgenerous in doing so. See Pederson v. Corrier, 91
Cal. App. 84, 204 P. Zd 417 (1947),; Neddo v. State, 275 App. Div. 492, 90
N. Y. S. 2d 650 (3d Dep't 1949) ; BrLu, THE More ADEQuATE AwARD (1952) ;
EVIDENCE IN ACHIEVING THE MoRE ADETHE UsE OF DEmoNsTRTnI
Ba
n,
QUATE AwARD (1952).
48 Smith Compensation for Automobile Accidents-A Symposium, 32 CoL.
L. REv. 789 (1932). Dean Smith's cogent observations are based upon the report of the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences
of February 1,1932.
49Ibid. More recent reliable figures are not available, and it may be that
today's inflated economy has resulted in a greater percentage of injured persons recovering in the absence of insurance, but the percentage is still doubtless
niggardly.

1952 ] IS THE LAW OFNEGLIGENCE OBSOLETEf

271

today, is outmoded and obsolete, particularly in urban centers
where the problem of calendar delay is such a critical one.
While the great expansions which have occurred in the frontiers of liability are, for the most part, all to the good, and
while there has evolved a rough and in many ways commendable system of common law social justice, the time has
come for a basic re-evaluation of the law of negligence.
"The accident problem of our mechanical age calls for
two things: accident prevention and the compensation of the
victims of accidents that do happen." 50 It is a tragic indictment of our present system that it has substantially failed in
both these aims. For example, more than one million persons have been killed by automobile accidents in the United
States 51 and most of these death cases very probably have
never been properly compensated. Of course, all the blame,
particularly as to accident prevention, cannot be laid at the
doorstep of the judge or lawyer, but it does seem obvious that
some alterations in the treatment of accident cases must
come about. The bench and bar, intimately concerned as
they are with accident litigation, are the logical ones to take
the lead in effecting such changes.
It is not the function of the present article to present a
detailed blueprint for solution of these problems but only to
underline their magnitude. Yet some possible alternatives
may be at least suggested.
One possibility of improvement, which appeals to the
present authors because it is a real step forward and yet does
not require radical innovation in substantive tort law (and
thus might more readily receive acceptance by the bench, bar,
and legislature), is to keep our legal doctrines as they are
except for such evolution as will naturally come about, and
to supplement them with statutory enactments requiring
potential defendants to carry adequate insurance in critical liability areas, such as in the automobile accident field.
This method would increase the extent to which accident vic60 James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L. J.549, 569 (1948).
51 See Address of John Cruickshank, Chief Safety Engineer of a leading
casualty insurance company. The New York Times, March 29, 1950, p. 31,
col. 1.
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tims obtain redress for their injuries, and might well, if the
insurance rates were graduated in terms of the safety records
of the insured persons, 52 aid considerably in accident prevention. It would not in itself, however, protect a plaintiff
from the "law's delay" or prevent a needy injured person
from being barred from redress by the operation of a rule of
law such as contributory negligence.
If compulsory insurance were superimposed upon our
present legal structure and this combination further strengthened by a system of substantial state aid to disabled and
impecunious accident victims who have been entirely barred
from recovery by contributory negligence or who have been
inadequately compensated in the light of their economic need
and loss of earning power, this solution might be a workable
one. Such state aid could conceivably be modeled on an expanded version of the recently adopted and very forwardlooking New York Disability Benefits Law. 3 The problem
of the "law's delay" could be met by advances from a state
disability fund which would be made to a needy plaintiff
pending trial with the agreement that the advances would be
repaid upon the plaintiff's achieving an adequate verdict. If
such a verdict were not forthcoming, the needy plaintiff
would retain the advances.
Advance payments would, it seems, be a necessary
element of any such scheme, at least until such time as procedures are devised for a true speed up and streamlining of
court procedures. Justice delayed is, in truth, justice denied
when we are dealing with a family breadwinner who has been
struck down by an accident, for it is small comfort for such
a plaintiff to receive a substantial award made years after
the crushing burdens of medical and other expenses have had
to be met. Under the present system, a plaintiff of this type
is apt to accept a very inadequate settlement from the insurer because he needs money immediately and cannot afford
to await the trial of the action.
52

Efforts have been made in the past to develop safety reward plans for individual automobile drivers. Swayer, Frontiers of Liability Insurance, 39
BEsr's 439 (1938). Such attempts seem, however, to have been largely abandoned. 43 BES's 13-14 (1942).
53Laws of N. Y. 1949, c. 600.
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The foregoing suggestion, which may be summarized as
the existing legal structure plus compulsory insurance plus,
where necessary, state aid to the needy accident victim (the
latter without regard to his personal fault) would result
mainly in shifting the loss from accidents directly to the
private insurers of defendants who have been guilty of negligence, and thus indirectly to the premium-paying group to
which such defendants belong (automobile drivers, real property owners and so on). In the cases of non-negligent defendants or inadequate verdicts, the state would step in to
help a needy accident victim, and thus the public as a whole
would bear a certain amount of the burden.
Another possible scheme is to cast aside entirely the
traditional doctrines of negligence law in critical accident
areas, and place the problem of injury redress, at least as to
automobile accidents, in the administrative realm, by analogy
to the Workmen's Compensation statutes which cover industrial accidents. A fairly strong case for this solution can
be made. It may be urged that, just as in the industrial field,
a certain toll of property damage and human sufferingsometimes because of individual "fault" and sometimes notis necessarily concomitant in other areas of a mechanized
civilization. Even with vigorous safety campaigns, there
will probably always be a reasonably large and comparatively
irreducible residuum of accidental damage, and it may be
argued that society at large should bear the burden lest it be
inflicted ruinously upon the individual. Strict liability of
this sort is not necessarily the "radical" innovation it may at
first appear to be. Indeed it may even be said that such a
change, rather than introducing a new and strange doctrine,
would in some sense be only a return to the strict liability of
the writ of trespass in the earlier common law, although the
burden of damages would be spread over the public rather
than, as under the early law, placed upon the individual.
An objection which can be made to this latter suggestion,
and indeed to any solution involving an extension of the insurance concept, is that such extension may possibly reduce
the exercise of care and increase accidents rather than decrease them. In some areas, of course, the presence of insurance may not have a substantial effect on the exercise of care.
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For example, if one is driving an automobile, he is careful,
if at all, mainly because he is concerned with his own safety,
and it is unlikely that he will be any the less careful no
matter how heavily he may be insured. But in some other
fields the picture may be different. For instance, a homeowner may be more diligent in seeking to protect business
visitors and licensees against injuries if he knows that the
financial burden of a liability suit is to rest upon him rather
than upon an insurance carrier. It may also be noted that
the ready availability of a recovery in the form of insurance
or compensation may be expected to produce in some plaintiffs the psychological phenomenon of fancied or exaggerated
injuries--the well known "compensation neurosis." It is believed that these possible disadvantages are outweighed by
the benefits to be gained by the wider use of insurance.
The present authors do not, however, favor the compensation method. It is our belief that the courts, trained as
they are in dealing with the facts and equities of particular
cases, and having broad latitude in awarding damages, can
more justly determine accident cases than can an administrative tribunal confined within the limits of a schedule requiring fixed monetary awards for certain injuries. Furthermore, it does not seem necessary to create a new and
additional tribunal if our present institutions can be used to
solve the problem.
Yet, if the administration of accident law is to remain with the courts, certain procedural modifications must
come about. As already noted, Justice Peck has made a
number of excellent suggestions along these lines, and they
need not be restated here. One further point should, however, be discussed.
The main stumbling block, so far as the factor of delay
in the administration of negligence law is concerned, is the
jury. It is the jury, too, which has been accused, probably
with much justification, of not following in practice the
theoretically applicable principles of substantive law. If an
extension of insurance coverage, as outlined earlier, were
combined with elimination of the jury trial, it would be possible to compensate speedily all those plaintiffs who have a
legitimate cause of action measured by the traditional prin-
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ciples of fault. While this is not, of course, a step lightly to
be taken, particularly in view of the state constitutional
questions involved, it may well be desirable as a long-run
solution. In any event, the present authors do not regard
it as a necessary immediate element of the system of extension of insurance coverage suggested above.
In place of the present single judge and jury system
there might be substituted a three-judge bench, specially
assigned to a Negligence Part of the court. These judges
would become, from continuous practice, experts in the field,
and thus one of the advantages of the administrative method
would be present. On the other hand, they could make awards
based on the justice of the whole case rather than, as administrators would, based on a rigid system of fixed valuations
for certain injuries. Whether more judges would be necessary under such a practice is a question not free from doubt.
Since the system would, it is hoped, eliminate long calendar
delay, settlements would be more frequent and the volume of
cases tried less in number. Trials would also be more expeditious.
Of course, this three-judge method, since it would involve the application of the present-day rules of negligence
and contributory negligence, would not solve the problem of
the plaintiff who has been injured through some fault of his
own. In one way or another the burdens of such a plaintiff,
if he is indigent, are going to fall on the public. As has been
pointed out above, the extension of state disability benefits
would take care of that difficulty.
In recapitulation, it is seen that the law of negligence
has undergone great changes for the better in the modern era.
Vistas of liability have been broadened, and enlightened
views of risk-spreading have gained much adherence. It may
be that another century of growth in the traditional common
law pattern would see a solution to our accident problem.
But undirected evolution is a woefully slow process in an
atomic age. Change, of course, is not per se progress, but,
on the other hand, we must not let a too deferential attitude
towards the law of the past weigh us down and result in a
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"dead hand" approach to the future.5 4

55
The law of negligence as it exists today is obsolete.

It

is necessary that procedural changes be made in the administration of that law to eliminate the inequities which today
exist. It is also necessary that a more than adequate system
of distributing the losses attendant upon our industrial society be devised. This can all be achieved within the structure of our present judicial system and it must be achieved
if that system is to survive.
Just as science is replacing the internal combustion aircraft engine with the jet engine, so must the law replace its
present methods with a "jet-propelled" system of tort justice. 6 The need is great. The solution is not clear. But time
-4 Dean Prosser puts it pithily: "We may find someday that a professor
arising in the classroom in 2551 will refer to the obsolete and ridiculous rules on
negligence that we are applying today in the same spirit of hilarity with which
we refer to the old Mosaic law. Our whole law of torts today may someday
be as obsolete as the law of weregild and deodand. We are simply a part of
the endless progress and development of things to come." Modern Trends in
the Law of Torts, 16 NEvADA STAt B. J. 51, 71, 72 (1951).
55 "... our society has undergone radical changes, and its needs, as we now
see them and have seen them for several decades, are far different from what
they were a century ago. And the simultaneous growth of insurance, with its
possibilities of risk-spreading and loss absorption, has changed our social context as much as any other single development. Things have been happening
through legislation in other departments of social life to forward the ideal of
mutual interdependability in our state and national communities. . . . [Olur
courts are undermining the old fault principles, little by little, in a manner
which leaves many of us puzzled and confused about the present state of the
law. . ... Whether . . . a new theory should acknowledge absolute liability
only for the consequences of extrahazardous conduct or should take the form
of an outright enterprise liability analogous to that reflected in the Workmen's
Compensation Acts is a matter 'which wiser heads in time may settle.'"
Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability,.37 VA. L. REv. 359, 396,
397 (1951).
56 It seems clear that we are living in an era in which the law of yesterday
will be discarded and that of tomorrow fabricated. As Judge Learned Hand,
some fifteen years ago, in the foreword to the 50th volume of the Harvard
Law Review, put it, "The period to be treated in these articles has therefore
been the seeding-time for a crop of new ideas, based upon a revolutionary
outlook. Final adjustments. if any are to be final, are certainly far in the
future, but whatever the course may be, these years will be looked back upon
as those in which the questions to be answered were emerging, and becoming
clamorous." Foreword, 50 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1936).
Professor Wilson has
noted the same trend in these words: "We are in the process, apparently,
of establishing new standards of social values, perhaps even new ideals, made
necessary by changed and changing conditions." Preface, WILSON, CASES ON
TORTS (1939).
See also Horne, Courts Rewriting Accident Concept, N. Y.
Times, p. 26, col. 2 (September 12, 1951), and Meriam and Thornton, "Accidental Injury" in the Court of Appeals: The Metamorphosis of a Rule of Law,
16 BROOLYvN L. REv. 203 (1950), for a study of these changing values as reflected in workmen's compensation cases.
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is running out, and the day for re-evaluation and recasting
of accident law is at hand. Deploring the present situation
is not enough; action should be the order of the day.5 7

57 New York has taken at least some action towards increased use of the
insurance device. As a supplement to its Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibility
Act [VEHICLE AND TRAmric LAw, Art. 6-A], that state recently enacted legislation [Laws of N. Y. 1952, c. 493, approved by the Governor on April 4, 1952]
which prohibits minors from operating motor vehicles on public highways unless covered by the standard automobile liability policy, with minimum coverage
of $10,000 for bodily injury to, or death of, one person, $20,000 for one accident, and $5,000 for property damage.
There is also an undercurrent in New York flowing in the direction of an
automobile compensation statute. Thus a bill was introduced in the 1952 legislative session [S. 2243, A. 2585] by Senator Zaretzki and Assemblyman Katz,
both of New York City, which would have created a temporary commission
of three senators, three assemblymen, and three appointees of the Governor to
study the need for a compensation plan for persons injured in motor vehicle
accidents. The bill did not pass. The present authors are not, of course,
opposed to the principle of broader compensation in the automobile accident
field [see on this point James and Thornton, The Impact of Inszurance on tiW
Law of Torts, 15 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 431, 443 (1950)]. Our feeling is,
however, that, under present conditions, it is more desirable to leave the mechanics of a broader method to be worked out by the courts within the framework of our present system as supplemented by statutes requiring wider insurance coverage.

